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Collateral Challenges in Criminal Proceedings: 
Mayday for Citizens Radio    
■
Po Jen Yap*
The Court of Appeal in Secretary of Justice v Ocean Technology has 
unfortunately cast a pall over the future of collateral challenges in Hong Kong 
criminal proceedings, contrary to the current trends and development of the 
English common law. It has conflated the criminal plea of a general defence with 
the constituent elements of a statutory offence; it has failed to consider a key CFA 
decision in Leung Kwok Hung and has misconstrued House of Lords precedents 
by examining whether the impugned statute authorised a collateral attack when it 
was the validity of the statute itself that was being challenged. 
Introduction
In Secretary of Justice v Ocean Technology,1 the Hong Kong Court of Appeal 
held that the accused in this case, Ocean Technology and five other defen-
dants, could not impugn the constitutionality of the licensing procedure 
provided under the Telecommunications Ordinance by way of defence when 
they were criminally charged under the said Ordinance. This article seeks to 
explain why the learned judges erred in law and argue for the Court of Final 
Appeal (CFA) to reverse the court’s decision if the case goes on appeal. 
Factual Matrix 
The facts of the case were as follows. The defendants, in 2005, had applied 
for a license to operate Citizens Radio, a non-commercial radio station that 
sought to provide sound broadcasting services to the public. Their applica-
tion was rejected by the Chief Executive in Council in late 2006. It was 
alleged that prior to the official rejection of their license, the defendants 
had already engaged in broadcasting without authorisation, a statutory 
offence under the Telecommunications Ordinance. The accused were sub-
sequently criminally charged in the Magistrate’s Court; in their defence, 
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1 (2008) HKEC 2114.
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they argued that the licensing procedure under the said Ordinance was an 
unconstitutional restriction on their freedom of expression as protected un-
der Article 27 and 39 of the Basic Law. 
Magistrate’s Decision 
The magistrate found for the accused on the following grounds. First, the 
decision to grant a sound broadcasting license under s 13C of the Tele-
communications Ordinance rested on the unfettered discretion of the 
Chief Executive in Council; this was contrary to the principle of legal 
certainty and was thus not “prescribed by law” as constitutionally required 
under Articles 27 and 39 of the Basic Law. Second, the Broadcasting 
Authority and the Chief Executive in Council, the recommending and 
decision making bodies for the grant of broadcast licences were not in-
dependent of the government and this violated the requirement of legal 
certainty to be constitutionally “prescribed by law” under Articles 27 and 
39. Third, the absence of a statutory right of appeal from the decision of 
the Chief Executive in the Council’s refusal to grant a license was also 
deemed contrary to the requirement of legal certainty and violated the 
“prescribed by law” principle under Articles 27 and 39. Since the licens-
ing regime was deemed unconstitutional, the magistrate concluded that 
any charges based upon the accused’s failure to comply with the licensing 
regime were also unconstitutional.2  
Court of Appeal’s Decision 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the magistrate’s decision 
and reversed his constitutional findings. The crux of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision rested on its proposition that a defendant may not challenge the 
constitutionality of the licensing procedure provided under the Telecom-
munications Ordinance by way of defence in a criminal proceeding brought 
2 Pending appeal, the magistrate suspended the effect of his determination of unconstitutionality. 
The Secretary of Justice also brought civil proceedings and obtained an eight- day exparte injunc-
tion to restrain the defendants from making further broadcasts. Justice Hartmann in Secretary of 
Justice v Ocean Technology, (2008) 2 HKLRD 82 refused to extend the injunction any further. In a 
subsequent judicial review action, Reyes J confirmed that the magistrate had the power of to sus-
pend his determination of unconstitutionality pending appeal. See Ocean Technology v Secretary of 
Justice (2009) HKEC 124.  
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against him under the said statute.3 Instead, , the Court of Appeal conclud-
ed that the applicants should have sought separate judicial review of the 
licensing system. The Court of Appeal advanced three overlapping reasons 
for their conclusion, the cogency of which will now be discussed. 
First, the Court of Appeal argued that “validity of a negative licens-
ing decision is not … an essential ingredient of the offence.”4  In other 
words, the Court of Appeal argued that the constitutionality of the offence 
— creating provisions of Section 85 and 206 in the Telecommunications 
Ordinance — did not depend on the legality of the licensing system, as 
the legality of the licensing procedure was not an ingredient for the statu-
tory offence to be made out. The English case of Quietlynn v Plymouth City 
Council7 was justified on the basis that on those facts, the legality of the de-
cision to refuse a license was a necessary ingredient of the offence.8 
With respect, herein the Court of Appeal had wrongly conflated two 
distinct legal concepts, ie they have confused the ingredients of an offence 
with a defence to an offence. The constituent elements / ingredients of an of-
fence are established when the actus reus and the mens rea of the crime are 
established. To discover what these ingredients / elements are, one needs to 
consult the penal provision in question. Nonetheless, it is open for the ac-
cused to argue that certain defences, which can exculpate the defendants, 
are applicable, notwithstanding the fact the ingredients of the offence have 
3 The Court of Appeal also held that the lack of independence of the Broadcasting Authority and 
Chief Executive in Council from the government and the absence of a statutory right of appeal 
from a licensing refusal from the Chief Executive in Council did not violate the principle of legal 
certainty pursuant to the “prescribed by law” requirement. The Court of Appeal was certainly 
right here as the requirement that a restriction upon a right be prescribed by law merely mandates 
that the relevant law be sufficiently specific, as far as the context reasonably permits, so that the 
citizen can foresee with reasonable certainty the consequences of a given action. However, one can 
argue that these measures, though prescribed by law, are not necessary in a democratic society and 
are disproportionate to the aims sought to achieve thereby. The government must still show how 
these abovementioned restrictions are: (1) rationally connected with one or more of the legitimate 
purposes ie in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; and (2) 
the means used to impair the right must be no more than necessary to accomplish the legitimate 
purpose in question.   
4 See  n 1 above at para 76. 
5 Section 8(1) of the Telecommunications Ordinance reads: “Save under and in accordance with a 
licence granted by the Chief Executive in Council or with the appropriate licence granted or cre-
ated by the Authority, no person shall in Hong Kong or on board any ship, aircraft or space object 
that is registered or licensed in Hong Kong (a) establish or maintain any means of telecommunica-
tions … ” 
6 Section 20 of the Telecommunications Ordinance reads: “Any person who contravenes section 
8(1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable (a) on summary conviction, to a fine of $50000 
and to imprisonment for 2 years; and (b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine of $100000 and to 
imprisonment for 5 years.”
7 [1988] QB 114.
8 See  n 1 above at para 76. On the facts in Quietlynn, the Divisional Court did not allow the de-
fendants to raise by way of defence the alleged invalidity of the government’s decision to refuse a 
licence and the criminal convictions were upheld. 
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been proven. General defences that may be applicable include self defence, 
crime prevention, necessity and duress.9 These defences are found in the 
common law and not all of them are statutory in origin. The accused were 
arguing that the unconstitutionality of the statute in question was another 
such defence. It was highly irregular for the courts to argue that this defence 
failed merely because the elements of the defence could not be found in the 
constituent elements of the statutory offence. After all, it is axiomatic that 
the penal statute in question will only definitively list out all the applicable 
ingredients of the offence in question, not the defences. 
Furthermore, even if we accept that the legality / constitutionality of 
the licensing procedure must also form part of the ingredients of the offence 
for the defence of unconstitutionality to be pleaded, the Court of Appeal’s 
explanation of Quietlynn was rather peculiar. In Quietlynn, criminal pro-
ceedings were brought against a company for using its premises as sex 
establishments without a license. In particular, paragraph 28 of Schedule 3 
to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act provided that a 
party who was already using the premises as a sex establishment prior to the 
application of the Schedule could lawfully continue to use the premises as a 
sex establishment “until the determination of the application.” The Hong 
Kong Court of Appeal explained that the statutory language “determination 
of the application” in Schedule 3 imported an implication that there be a 
“lawful determination of the application”,10 hence the legality of the license 
was an ingredient of the offence in Quietlynn. What was puzzling about the 
Court of Appeal’s reasoning here was that the learned judges were amena-
ble to reading in the word “lawful” into a determination under Schedule 3 
of the English Act, but were unwilling to read the same word / requirement 
into s 8 of the Telecommunications Ordinance. After all, s 8 reads: “Save 
under and in accordance with a license granted by the Chief Executive in 
Council …” Therefore, based on the Court of Appeal’s own reading of Qui-
etlynn, can one not also argue that the term “in accordance with a license” 
under s 8 of the Telecommunications Ordinance should import a similar 
implication that the license granted be “lawful”?                      
The second ground on which the Court of Appeal refused the collateral 
challenge was more dubious. The Court of Appeal held that it was not open 
to a defendant to raise by way of defence the legality of a licensing decision 
or scheme, as this would be “contrary to the clear policy of the legislative 
scheme as a whole.”11 The judges relied on the House of Lords decisions 
9 Michael Jackson, Criminal Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: HKU Press, 2003), p 278. 
10 See n 1 above at para 76.
11 Ibid, at para 95. 
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of R v Wicks12 and Boddington v British Transport Police13 for this proposi-
tion, in particular Lord Hoffman’s dictum in Wicks. In deciding whether a 
defendant in criminal proceedings was entitled to challenge the vires of an 
administrative act done under statutory authority where its validity formed 
part of the prosecution’s case or its invalidity would constitute a defence, 
Lord Hoffman held that:
“The question must depend entirely upon the construction of the statute under 
which the prosecution was brought. The statute may require the prosecution to 
prove that the act in question is not open to challenge on any ground available 
in law, or it may be a defence to show that it is.”14 
A fortiori, the judges on the Court of Appeal reasoned that they would turn 
to the statute in question to decide whether a collateral challenge on the 
facts was statutorily authorised. Therein lay the patent error committed 
by the Court. In both Wicks and Boddington, the House of Lords were con-
sidering whether to allow a criminal defence that sought to challenge the 
legality of the administrative order or byelaw, ie the accused were arguing 
that the respective byelaw / administrative order was ultra vires the enabling 
statute in question. Naturally one has to construe the statute, the order / 
byelaw’s enabling legislation, to decide whether the statute authorised a 
collateral challenge, to the order or subsidiary legislation in question, by 
way of defence to a criminal charge. However, on our facts in Ocean Tech-
nology, the Court of Appeal was considering whether to allow a defence 
that impugned the constitutionality of the statute itself, ie whether the stat-
ute was ultra vires the Basic Law. With respect, it was illogical for the courts 
to examine the very instrument whose constitutionality or legality was be-
ing challenged to decide whether that instrument authorised a collateral 
attack on itself. After all, the House of Lords in Wicks and Boddington did 
not examine the byelaw to decide whether the byelaw itself allowed for a 
collateral challenge to its legality. Accordingly, it was illogical for the Court 
of Appeal to glean from Wicks and Boddington a requirement that the courts 
should examine whether the statute authorised a collateral attack when it 
was the validity of the statute itself that was being challenged.         
Thirdly, the Court of Appeal seemed to imply that there was no breach 
of the Basic Law as no constitutional right was engaged at all. The Court 
of Appeal held that it was necessary for the government to regulate the 
12 [1998] AC 92.
13 [1999] 2 AC 143.
14 See n 10 above at 117. 
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airwaves or they would become overcrowded, which would impede effec-
tive communication; a fortiori the Court reasoned as follows: 
“Given that the requirement for a broadcasting licence is a permissible fetter on 
the freedom of expression, and that there is no right to a licence, it is difficult 
to see… upon what basis it was relevant for him (the magistrate) to determine 
whether the discretion of the Chief Executive in Council to grant or refuse a 
licence was prescribed by law.”15
This was an unfortunate judicial sleight of hand. By characterising the 
defendant’s claim to his constitutional right of free expression as a claim for 
a right to a broadcast license, the Court created for itself the opportunity to 
dismiss the existence of such a right and avoid having to adjudicate wheth-
er the licensing scheme was a justified restriction on his free expression. By 
way of example, imagine if our constitutional right to free assembly is char-
acterised as a claim for a right to a “no objections” notification from the 
police.16 Viewed under those terms, such a right to a “no objection” notifi-
cation obviously does not exist and any bans on notified public assemblies, 
however unreasonable, must then be constitutional. This approach taken 
by the Court of Appeal certainly did not give a generous interpretation to 
our  constitutional rights, the methodology espoused by the CFA in Ng Ka 
Ling.17 Certainly, given the nature of broadcasting, it must be regulated in 
technical ways that other forms of verbal expression need not. But a rights 
oriented approach would be for the Court to acknowledge that the defen-
dants’ right to free expression had been curtailed by the licensing scheme 
and to require the prosecution to show that this restriction was both pre-
scribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, before the impugned 
statutory restriction could be upheld.18           
Besides the three unsatisfactory reasons the Court of Appeal gave for 
refusing a collateral challenge to the validity of the Telecommunications 
Ordinance in a criminal proceeding, this case was also wrongly decided be-
cause the approach taken by the Court was fundamentally inconsistent with 
the CFA decision in Leung Kwok Hung,19 a case which the Court of Appeal 
unfortunately did not consider.
15 See  n 1 above at para 69. 
16 Section 14(1) of the Public Order Ordinance confers the Commissioner of Police the authority to 
prohibit notified public processions and meetings if he reasonably considers that the objection is 
necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
17 [1999] 1 HKLRD 315.
18 See Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR [2005] 3 HKLRD 164.
19 Ibid.
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In Leung Kwok Hung, the defendants had organised a public procession 
of about 40–100 people without pre-notifying the police as required under 
the Public Order Ordinance (POO). After their arrests, they challenged the 
constitutionality of the legislation on the basis that the statutory discretions 
conferred on the Police Commissioner to object to a notified public posses-
sion and to impose conditions if he reasonably considered these methods 
to be necessary, in the interests of public order (ordre public), were too 
wide and uncertain.20 The CFA upheld the notification requirement but 
accepted that the Commissioner’s powers to restrict peaceful assembly for 
the public order (ordre public) was constitutionally vague and thus severed 
ordre public from public order in the “law and order” sense.21 Since the de-
fendants had not complied with the notification procedures, the severance 
of the constitutional invalid provisions did not affect their appeal and their 
convictions in the magistrate’s court were confirmed.             
Three important observations can be made about this CFA case which 
cast doubt on the correctness of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ocean 
Technology. First, the CFA did not forbid the accused from impugning the 
constitutionality of the licensing procedure as provided under the POO 
by way of defence when they were criminally charged under the said Ordi-
nance. Furthermore, the accused was partially successful in challenging the 
constitutionality of the powers vested in the Commissioner of Police to ban 
or restrict notified public processions even though in their case, they had 
not even notified the police in the first place. Finally, in deciding whether 
it was appropriate to determine the constitutionality of the notification 
scheme, the CFA did not examine the statutory context of the POO to 
see whether it was the legislative intention that the legality of a notifica-
tion decision or an aspect of the notification scheme was an ingredient of 
the offence. In other words, the CFA did not examine whether the statute 
in question authorised a collateral attack when it was the validity of the 
statute itself that was being challenged. Instead, in determining whether 
the statutory provision was constitutional, the CFA discussed whether the 
restriction imposed by the notification scheme was “prescribed by law” 
and “necessary” in a democratic society.  Fortunately, the CFA also did not 
characterise the constitutional right to free assembly as a claim for a right 
to a “no objections” notification from the police and did not cursorily con-
clude that no constitutional right was engaged at all.
20 Ibid, at 176. 
21 Ibid, at 196.
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Conclusion  
The Court of Appeal had unfortunately cast a pall over the future of collat-
eral challenges in Hong Kong criminal proceedings, contrary to the current 
trends and development of the English common law.22 It had conflated 
the criminal plea of a general defence with the constituent elements of a 
statutory offence; it had failed to consider a key CFA decision and had mis-
construed House of Lords precedents by examining whether the impugned 
statute authorised a collateral attack when it was the validity of the statute 
itself that was being challenged; and it had put the statutory cart before the 
constitutional horse by mischaracterising our constitutional rights.  One 
can only hope that the Court of Final Appeal can someday heed this (pos-
sibly faint) distress signal and salvage the law from the current wreck.  
  
      
22 See Christopher Forsyth, “Collateral Challenges and the Foundations of Judicial Review: Ortho-
doxy Vindicated and Procedural Exclusivity Rejected” (1998) Public Law 364. See also Searby Ltd 
[2003] EWCA Crim 1910 where the English Court of Appeal confirmed that the trial judge was 
obliged to consider a defence that the criminal provision in question was invalid because it con-
flicted with directly applicable EU law. 
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